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INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-one years since Bruner and Postman (1947) 
coined the term "perceptual defense" to account for the re­
lationship between stimulus emotionality (the amount of affect 
or emotionality associated with the stimulus) and the diffi­
culty in recognizing such stimuli, hundreds of studies have 
been done in an attempt to determine what factors are relevant 
to the perceptual defense phenomenon. In general, the findings 
have been that the recognition threshold for emotional stimuli 
differs from that for neutral stimuli, depending upon the per­
sonality of the subject and the degree of emotionality assoc­
iated with the stimulus— the main idea being that there is 
some actual change in the perceptual system. Perceptual de­
fense is said to occur when the recognition threshold for 
emotional stimuli is higher than that for neutral stimuli.
The opposite trend is known as "perceptual vigilance" or 
"perceptual sensitization."
Because there has been a great deal of controversy as 
to whether there really is a phenomenon of perceptual defense, 
Erfksen (1954) pointed out three variables that must be con­
trolled in studying perceptual defense; 1) the emotionality 
associated with the stimulus, 2) stimulus familiarity, and 
3) response inhibition. In any study it must be demonstrated 
that the emotionality associated with the experimental or 
'emotional' stimulus actually differs from that associated 
\vith the control or 'neutral' stimulus. It must also be 
demonstrated that any perceptual defense effect is not due
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to differential familiarity with the experimental and control 
stimuli nor due to subjects' tendency to inhibit certain re­
sponses. Perceptual defense studies in the past have failed 
to control these three variables adequately.
A fourth variable which has been ignored by most research­
ers in the area of perceptual defense was identified by Blum 
in a series of studies (Blum, 1954, 1955, 1957) and has been 
discussed briefly in a few review articles (Brown, 1961; Eriksen, 
1960; Minard, 1965; Natsoulas, 1965; Nelson, 1955; Smock, 1956). 
This is the "stimulus effect hypothesis" (Natsoulas, 1965).
It suggests that one may recognize neutral and emotional stimuli 
equally well but respond to them differently— that the perception 
of some aspect of the emotional stimulus may trigger an avoidance 
reaction in the subject which results in the inhibition of 
emotional responses. The purpose of this paper, then, was to 
determine the most effective ways of controlling the three 
variables discussed by Eriksen (1954) and to incorporate them 
in a study which was designed to evaluate the stimulus-effect 
hypothesis.
Definitions:
Emotional Stimuli (ES)... stimuli conveying enough affective 
meaning to elicit behavior indicating emotional arousal.
Neutral Stimuli (NS)... stimuli which do not convey enough 
affective meaning to elicit behavior indicating emotional 
arousal.
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Perceptual Defense (PD)...the tendency to perceive a neutral 
stimulus more easily than an emotional stimulus.
Emotional Response...a response which acknowledges the presence 
of an emotional stimulus.
Neutral Response...a response which acknowledges the presence 
of a neutral stimulus.
Ert...the tendency to suppress emotional responses when the 
stimulus is emotional.
Nrt...the tendency to suppress emotional responses when the 
stimulus is neutral.
Control of Stimulus Emotionality:1 . " . 1 1 ; 1 \ • V \ ' * 1
As Eriksen (1954) and Brown (1961) have pointed out, in 
many PD studies the emotionality associated with the discrim- 
inable stimuli has simply been taken for granted. In some 
cases the experimental design was such as to make it very 
probable that the emotionality associated with the experimental 
stimuli was greater than that associated with the control stim­
uli® Brown & Yandell (1966), for instance, made half of their 
subjects feel that they had done poorly on a task and the 
other half feel as though they had done well. They then pre­
sented the subjects success, failure and neutral words, assuming 
that the failure words would be more emotional for the subjects 
who felt that they had done poorly on the task. Bootzin & 
Stephens (1967), and Caron & Wallach (1959) assumed the same
Ithing when they induced the feeling of failure in their subjects
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and had specific stimuli related to this failure. In similar 
studies it was assumed that the failure associated with failed 
anagram words gave these words negative affect making them 
suitable ES in the PD study (Eriksen & Browne, 1956; Postman 
& Solomon, 1950; Spence, 1957).
In a brief pilot study, however, the present writer found 
that there were no consistent changes in the affect associated 
with failed anagram words as indicated by changes in semantic 
differential responses for these words. When questioned about 
this subjects commonly said that the anagram problems were fun 
and that they didn't have the feeling of failure associated 
with them. In these cases mentioned above it seems that Eriksen 
and Brown's demand for a demonstration of differential emotion­
ality between experimental and control stimuli is appropriate.
In a number of studies stimuli which were generally 
accepted as emotional were used as the experimental stimuli. 
Loiselle (1966) and Loiselle & Williamson (1966), for instance, 
assumed that certain photographs were more emotion provoking 
than others ie. nudes^vs. scenery; and Lazarus, Eriksen, and 
Fonda (1951) assumed sexual and aggressive material to be 
emotionally threatening to certain types of subjects. However, 
no attempt was made to validate these assumptions. Bryant, 
Turner, and Lair (1967) and Nothman (1962) used "taboo” words 
as their ES without attempting to validate their emotional 
value. It may well be that these kinds of stimuli are emotional 
for the majority of subjects due to the feelings of anxiety
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or embarrassment or tension, etc. associated with them; but 
as Brown and Eriksen pointed out, the emotionality associated 
with each stimulus should be determined for each individual 
subject.
When words are used as ES and NS, one of the most common 
ways of determining stimulus emotionality has been by a word 
association test as suggested by Bootzin & Natsoulas (1965),
Brown (1961), Goldstein (1962, 1964 & 1966), and Mathews & 
Wertheimer (1958). The procedure is to tell the subject that 
he is going to be presented a list of words and that he is to 
respond to each word with the first word that enters his mind.
The test words are then read to the subject, one at a time, 
and the subject's response time for each word is recorded.
The list is then repeated with the subject instructed to give 
the same response to each word. According to Jungian theory, 
the degree of emotionality associated with each word, as indi­
cated by a number of autonomic changes, is directly correlated 
with the latency of the response and failure to give the same 
response on the second presentation. (Jung, 1918). Therefore 
the emotional words are indicated by longer response latencies 
and repetition failures while neutral words have shorter response 
latencies and correctly recalled responses.
E. M. Coles (1965) has denied the validity of studies 
which use this measure of emotionality on the ground that the 
word association test has not been demonstrated to be a valid 
indicator of stimulus emotionality. In his reply to this,
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Brown (1965b) had to agree that there is inadequate evidence 
underlying the assumptions of the word association test and 
that it is very sensitive to other variables as well as to 
stimulus emotionality. It has been demonstrated, in fact, 
that the word association test is a better indicator of stim­
ulus familiarity and of associative strength than an indicator 
of stimulus emotionality (Brown, 1965a; Freeborg, 1967; Levlnger 
& Clark, 1961).
As psychological events are often reflected in a number 
of different physiological reactions to stimulation, a more 
promising approach to the identification of emotional material 
might employ the measurement of certain physiological activ­
ities. According to Runquist & Ross (1959):
There are a number of so-called physiological responses 
such as GSR, pulse rate, respiration rate, skin temper­
ature, etc., which frequently have been used to define 
emotionality. The hypothesis may thus be formulated 
that the magnitude of these responses is some increasing 
function of the intensity of the hypothetical emotional 
response (p.329).
One problem with such a global statement, however, is that
the symptoms of emotionality are specific to each indi­
vidual. That is, not all physiological systems are acti­
vated by stress or noxious stimulation, but there are 
individual differences not only in intensity of the emo­
tional response but also in the particular autonomic 
channel through which it discharges (Runquist & Spence, 
1959, p.417).
This was also concluded from the findings of several other 
researchers (Jost & Sontag, 1944; Lacey, Bateman & VanLehn,
1953; Wenger, 1941). Another problem, as pointed out by Davis, 
Buchwald & Frankmann (1955), is that the patterns of different
responses through the autonomic nervous system change with 
repeated stimulation. That is, some autonomic responses get 
larger with repeated stimulation while other responses - in­
cluding the GSR - show an extinction or habituation effect 
and gradually disappear.
In spite of the problems of individual differences and 
the habituation effect, Montague & Coles (1966) still suggest 
that "the galvanic skin response (GSR) is the most sensitive 
physiological indicator of psychological events available to 
the psychologist (p. 261)." It is elicited by a wide variety 
of motor responses such as coughing, laughing, flexing a 
muscle, making a quick movement, etc.; and it is easily elic­
ited by sudden changes in external stimuli as when the subject 
is startled by an electric shock, bright light or loud tone.
As emphasized by Flanagan (1967), the GSR is readily elicited 
by all the "accidental variables that are relevant to attention 
(ie. novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc. (p. 8)." At the 
same time, however, the GSR is also very responsive to emo­
tional changes and is widely accepted as a measure of emotion­
ality.
Dittes (1957a), for instance, reviewed a case history 
of psychotherapy with one patient and concluded that as therapy 
progressed the patient's feelings of fear and embarrassment 
in the interpersonal relationship gradually extinguished as 
indicated by a progressive decrease and disappearance of the 
patient's GSRs. In another review Dittes (1957b) interpreted
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the GSR as "a measure of the anxiety of the patient, or his 
"mobilization" against any cue threatening punishment by the 
therapist (p. 303)," and showed that the patient's GSR was 
inversely related to the judged permissiveness of the therapist. 
This inverse relationship between inferred anxiety and ther­
apist permissiveness was somewhat obscured by the fact that 
the GSRs were also related to the emotional significance of 
the patient's speech.
Reyher & Smeltzer (1968) assumed that the GSR measured 
the emotionality associated with responses when they concluded 
that visual imagery is accompanied by more anxiety than is 
verbal association because imagining the stimulus word elic­
ited greater GSRs than associating to it. Similarly, Craig & 
Weinstein (1965) using the GSR as "a physiological measure of 
affect arousal," concluded that observing a model get shocked 
for repeated failures on a perceptual-motor task was more 
emotional than observing success on the task. This followed 
from the finding that subjects observing repeated failures 
gave larger GSRs than subjects observing success.
In a series of studies (Runquist & Ross, 1958, 1959; 
Runquist & Spence, 1959) the GSR and pulse rate changes were 
assumed to be indicators of "emotional responsiveness to weak
f
noxious stimulation (Runquist &Ross, 1959, p.330)." These 
measures were used to classify subjects as emotional or non- 
emotional in an attempt to evaluate the relationship of high 
and low levels of responsiveness to performance in eyelid
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conditioning. The writers, however, suggested that these 
physiological measures, may reflect "skeletal startle responses" 
rather than true emotional responsiveness; and in this case 
one should perhaps refer to the different levels of physio­
logical responses as indicative of different drive levels 
which in turn might be interpreted as different levels of 
emotional responsiveness.
In the studies described above the assumption has been 
that the GSR is a valid indicator of emotionality. While 
there is some controversy as to how valid it really is (Flan­
agan, 1967; Levinger & Clark, 196.1; Runquist & Ross, 1959; 
Runquist & Spence, 1959), there is considerable evidence sup­
porting its use in this way.
In a classical conditioning experiment by Diven (1937), 
for instance, a word was paired a number of times with shock; 
and as expected, that word became the CS for the GSR. The 
affect associated with this critical word generalized to words 
of related meaning which were then able to elicit a GSR also.
In a similar study Peastrel, Wishner & Kaplan (1968) showed 
essentially the same thing - that the affect associated with 
the critical word will generalize to synonyms or homophones 
depending upon the mental set induced by the instructions.
In these studies it seems logical to infer that the GSRs are 
elicited by the negative affect associated with the critical 
and related words.
Forrest & Dimond (1967) analyzed the GSRs that were elic-
ited by different responses during Rorschach testing for 23 
subjects and concluded that the GSR can be thought of as an 
index of the subject's anxiety level. Panek & Martin (1959) 
made the same conclusion when they found a significant corre­
lation between speech disturbances and GSRs during psychotherapy. 
In fact, they suggested: "An index based upon both speech dis­
turbance measures and occurrence of GSR dips should prove to 
be a fairly reliable and valid indication of momentary changes 
in anxiety level in psychotherapy interviews (p.405)."
More direct support of the GSR as a measure of emotion­
ality comes from studies in desensitization therapy. Geer
(1966), for instance, demonstrated that subjects who reported 
great fear of spiders gave greater GSRs when shown pictures 
of spiders than when shown pictures of snakes. They also 
gave larger GSRs to pictures of spiders than other subjects 
who reported low fear of spiders. In a similar study Wilson
(1967) demonstrated that perfect separation could be made 
between high-fear and low-fear subjects on the basis of their 
GSRs to ES and NS. Clark (1963) emphasized the value of the 
GSR amplifier as a means of detecting changes in emotional 
states during systematic desensitization of a phobia. In 
his study the GSR was closely watched for detection of sympa­
thetic activity below the threshold of subjective appreciation. 
"Resistances tended to show a slight sudden drop when any 
stimulus was advanced too far and this occurred several times 
well before the subject actually felt any anxiety (p.66)."
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As mentioned earlier, a number of researchers have simply 
assumed that taboo words are more emotional than neutral words. 
Dixon (1958) demonstrated that this was true by showing that 
"all seven S's gave higher average GSRs for emotional items 
than they did for neutral ones (p.31)." This was especially 
revealing, for the stimuli were presented at a level of bright­
ness below the absolute threshold, and no subject reported 
having seen any of them. It seems doubtful, therefore, that 
the GSRs would have been due to the attention variables of 
novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc. referred to by Flanagan 
(1967). Zajonc (1962) found similar results when he presented 
taboo and neutral words tachistoscopically and showed that on 
all trials the GSRs elicited by the taboo words exceeded those 
elicited by neutral words. McCurdy (1950) reviewed a number 
of studies which supported the hypothesis that there is a 
significant correlation between GSRs elicited by taboo and 
neutral words and the subjective judgments of emotionality 
for each word. In his own study McCurdy found this correlation 
to be .76.
In a recent review of a number of such studies and fol­
lowing an evaluation of the factors eliciting GSRs, Flanagan
(1967) concluded:
Present results indicate that the concept of attention 
is a better intervening variable interpretation of GSR 
than is the concept of emotion. Experienced GSR researchers 
have repeatedly indicated this conclusion. However, those 
interested in personality have continued to interpret GSR
as an index of emotion or anxiety The distinction is
also of importance to experimental designs because the
12
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accidental variables that are relevant to attention (ie. 
novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc.) are typically 
ignored by experimenters who regard the GSR as an index 
of emotion or anxiety (p.8).
It is not the intention of the present writer to present 
the GSR as the final and flawless answer to a measure of emo­
tionality for PD research. It is not, however, reasonable 
to ignore its possible advantages over other methods of meas­
urement simply because it is affected by a number of variables 
unrelated to emotionality. It is suggested, however, that 
one can reliably use the GSR as an indicator of emotionality 
by controlling the extraneous variables which can affect it 
such as suddenness, novelty, expectancy, muscufar movements, 
etc. Even Flanagan (1967) and Levinger & Clark (1961), who 
criticized its use in this way, agree that one thing it can 
and does measure is the emotional response.
Another approach to measuring the emotionality associated 
with various stimuli is simply to ask each subject how emotional
each stimulus is for him. This has been the typical approach
$
in desensitization therapy. A patient identifies his areas 
of tension, fear, etc., by indicating on a questionnaire the 
degree of tension associated with various situations and ob­
jects. There are a number of studies on the validity of such 
questionnaires or "fear survey schedules" as they are called 
(Geer, 1965; Laynor & Manosevitz, 1966; Rubin, Katkin, Weiss 
& Efran, 1968; Wolpe & Lang, 1964). The general finding has 
been that patients can and do accurately identify areas of 
tension. Additional validation of such questionnaires comes
from reports of therapy in which patients indicate reduced 
anxiety associated with phobic objects following successful 
desensitization therapy (Garlington & Cotier, 1968; Lang & 
Lazovik, 1963). And as mentioned earlier, Clark (1963), Geer
(1966), and Wilson (1967) all found that items identified as 
highier in the hierarchy of feared items elicited significantly 
greater GSRs than those lower in the hierarchy. Depending 
upon the confidence one has in the GSR as a measure of emo­
tionality in this type of situation, this is additional support 
for the validity of such introspective measures of feelings.
Zuckerman & Lubin (1964), in attempting to validate an 
adjective-eheck-list type questionnaire to measure temporary 
changes in moods, warned of subjects' tendencies to falsify 
the report in order to give the experimenter what he is looking 
for. This is what Orne (1962) referred to when he wrote about 
the "demand characteristics" of the experimental situation:
Subjects are concerned about their performance in terms 
of reinforcing their self-image; nonetheless, they seem 
even more concerned with the utility of their performances. 
We might well expect then that as far as the subject is 
able, he will behave in an experimental context in a 
manner designed to play the role of a "good subject" or, 
in other wor&s, to validate the experimental hypothesis 
(p.778).
Rosenthal (1966) also emphasized the effect of approval seeking
behavior when he wrote:
The task the experimenter formally sets for the subject 
is only one problem the subject must solve. Riecken (1962) 
called attention also to the subjects' "deutero-problem," 
the problem of "doping out the experiment" so his perfor­
mance can be an appropriate one, and one that will lead 
to favorable evaluation (p.181).
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In addition to emphasizing the "demand characteristics” 
of an experiment, these statements also point out the problem 
of subjects' need to give a favorable impression. As Azrin, 
Holz & Goldiamond (1961) demonstrated, subjects enter a sit­
uation with preestablished response tendencies which can inter­
fere with the experimental instructions. It may be impossible 
to eliminate these tendencies altogether, and no doubt in 
answering any introspective questionnaire there will be some 
tendency towards social conformity and giving a good impression 
of onself. It would seem, however, that these tendencies could 
be considerably reduced by removing all threat of personal 
exposure or embarrassment and by stressing the necessity of 
giving honest, unbiased responses. After all, as Rosenthal 
and Orne have pointed out, subjects want to be good subjects; 
they want to cooperate as well as they can.
Control of Stimulus Familiarity:
The second factor that must be controlled in PD studies 
is the stimulus familiarity, for the subject's familiarity 
with the stimulus can contribute to differential response 
tendencies. It has been shown, for instance, that there is a 
direct relationship between the frequency of the subject's 
experiences with the stimulus and the tendency to respond with 
it in an ambiguous situation (Taylor, Rosenfeldt & Shultz, 
1961). Goldiamond & Hawkins (1958) demonstrated this by pre­
senting nonsense syllables to subjects a various number of
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times to establish different amounts of familiarity with each 
stimulus. The subjects were then told that these nonsense 
syllables would be presented tachistoscopically and that they 
should guess at each presentation. Actually, however, only 
hash marks were presented in the tachistoscope. Goldiamond 
found that the responses were directly correlated with the 
frequency of prior experiences with the stimuli— thus showing 
that one's responses are directly affected by the familiarity, 
with the stimuli.
A number of approaches have been used to control the 
factor of familiarity in PD studies. A very common one has 
employed novel stimuli as the discriminanda. Bootzin & Stephans
(1967), for instance, used unique eight-sided figures as their 
stimuli and made certain that the subjects' familiarity with 
all of the figures was the same. Blum (1955) used Blacky 
Pictures as his discriminanda and presented them to advanced 
graduate students in Psychology who had been working with them 
for an extended period of time. Thus Blum attempted to con­
trol for stimulus familiarity by making sure the subjects were 
all very familiar with the stimuli. Other approaches have been 
to use as discriminable stimuli such things as sketches (Law­
rence & Coles, 1954), numbers (Loiselle, 1966; Loiselle & 
Williamson, 1966), and nonsense syllables CPhares, 1962).
Rather than utilizing novel stimuli many PD studies have 
used emotional and neutral words as the stimuli to be recog­
nized; but as has been pointed out before, most of these studies
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have failed to control adequately for stimulus familiarity 
(Eriksen, 1954; Brown, 1961). One common attempt to control 
this variable has been to select the experimental words from 
Thorndike and Lorge's Teacher's word book of 50,000 words 
(Brown & Yandell, 1966; Buck & Scammon, 1966; Eriksen & Browne, 
1956; Goldstein, 1962 & 1964; Goldstein, Himmelfarb & Feder, 
1962; Mathews & Wertheimer, 1958; Minard, 1965; Minard, Bailey 
& Wertheimer, 1965; Minard & Mooney, 1969; Nothman, 1962;
Postman & Solomon, 1950; Solomon & Howes, 1951; Spence, 1957; 
Taylor et al., 1961). In such studies the attempt has been 
to select control words that appear with the same frequency 
as the experimental words with which they are paired. The 
criticism directed against this has been that the frequency 
of occurrence in literature is not as good an indicator of 
familiarity as the subjects' own evaluation of the familiarity 
of experimental words. It was found, for instance, that there 
was a statistically significant relationship between recog­
nition thresholds and the evaluated familiarity— the more 
familiar words having lower recognition thresholds than the 
less familiar words. This tendency was similar for the words 
when familiarity was determined by the Thorndike-Lorge word 
frequency; but in this case the relationship was not statistic- 
ally significant, suggesting that the former method of deter­
mining familiarity is superior (Bryant et al., 1967).
Controlling for the subject's familiarity with the exper­
imental stimuli can be thought of in another way^-as controlling
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for mental sets which the subject will form before and during 
the experiment. When the subject, for instance, has been 
exposed to the experimental stimuli just before the PD study, 
this recency of experience with the stimuli will give him an 
expectancy to see them and thus lower his recognition threshold 
for them. Postman & Solomon (1950), for instance, demonstrated 
that experience with words in an anagram study immediately 
prior to the tachistoscopic presentation of these words and 
other words of equal length and frequency made it easier to 
recognize the anagram words. Very similar results were found 
in a replication of this study by Eriksen & Browne (1956), and 
it was concluded in each case that a mental set was established 
which increased the strength of the anagram words as responses.
The controlling of mental sets is necessary in any PD 
study. They can be manipulated as in the previously mentioned 
studies in which the recency of experience with certain stimuli 
created an expectancy to see them; but if the experimenter 
wishes to avoid mental sets, he has to be very careful in 
designing his study. In the past, one of the major problems 
has been that the subject comes into the experimental situ­
ation with a number of preestablished mental sets. This has 
been especially true in studies which have used taboo words 
and lewd or unpleasant pictures as the ES, for most of the 
subjects come into the experimental situation with a low ex­
pectancy for such stimuli.
It can easily be seen that mental sets are based upon
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a number of different factors: frequency of occurrence of the 
stimuli, familiarity with the stimuli, recency of exposure to 
the stimuli, social acceptability of the stimuli, internal 
motivational states, and experimental instructions. Since all 
of these factors can influence response tendencies, they must 
be controlled in order to demonstrate the effects of emotion­
ality on the perceptual system.
An alternative explanation for the effect of mental sets 
has been discussed by Postman (1953), Brown (1961), and Kempler 
& Wiener (1963). Basically the idea is that mental sets yield 
hypotheses as to what the stimuli will be; and the stronger 
the hypothesis is, the less the amount of information that will 
be needed to confirm it. Consequently a correct mental set 
would yield a lower recognition threshold while an incorrect 
mental set would yield a higher one. The claim here is that 
PD is not due to any actual change in the perceptual system; 
but rather it is due to a change in the amount of information 
needed to recognize the stimulus.
Regardless of whether mental sets affect recognition 
thresholds through changes in the response tendencies or through 
changes in the amount of information needed to identify the 
stimulus, it is clear that they must be controlled if PD is 
to be explained in terms of changes in the perceptual system 
due to the emotionality associated with the stimuli.
Control of Response Suppression:
The third factor that must be controlled in any PD study
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is the tendency to inhibit responses. There have been a number 
of attempts to disprove the existence of PD by demonstrating 
that the apparent differences in recognition thresholds are 
due to response suppression rather than to any perceptual 
process. One approach has been to show that the PD effect 
drops out when the subject does not have to respond with an 
emotion arousing response. Nothman (1962), for instance, 
presented taboo and neutral words tachistoscopically under 
four different response conditions and found that the PD effect 
was significantly less when the subject responded in writing 
rather than orally. He also found that the PD effect dis­
appeared when a subject was required to give only a fragment 
of the stimulus word instead of all of it,
Zajonc (1962) showed essentially the same thing when he 
trained his subjects to respond to words with other words 
which had been paired with the stimuli in a paired-associates 
learning situation. At one time the stimulus was an emotional 
word, and the response was either another emotional word or 
a neutral word which had been learned. At other times the 
stimulus was a neutral word while the response was either a 
neutral or an emotional word. He found that the differences 
in recognition thresholds were due more to the responses that 
were required than to the stimuli which were presented.
In a different approach to eliminating response suppres­
sion Goldstein et al. (1962) presented pairs of words tach­
istoscopically, one neutral and one emotional, and required
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the subject to say which side one of them was on. The subject 
was told what the two words were and which one to look for.
This eliminated the necessity of responding with the emotional 
or neutral word, and under such circumstances no PD was found. 
This seems reasonable, however, for in such a situation recog­
nition of either the neutral or the emotional word would indi­
cate what side the required word was on. The effect of response 
bias was demonstrated also, for it was found that there were 
significant side preferences depending upon whether the word 
to be recognized was emotional or neutral. In a different 
experiment the conditions were all the same except that the 
stimuli were hash marks instead of the stimulus words. The 
subjects didn't know this, and they responded as they had in 
the previous experiment demonstrating side preferences depend­
ent upon the word that was to be recognized.
To demonstrate further the relationship between response 
suppression and recognition thresholds Goldstein (1962) com­
pared the pseudo-accuracy scores of a stimulus-absent group 
to the accuracy scores of a stimulus-present group. By means 
of a word association test a list of four emotional and four 
neutral words was selected for each subject. Each subject 
in the stimulus-present group was then given this list and 
told to guess which word was presented each time from the 
list. The words were then presented tachistoscopically at 
an exposure time of 50 to 100 msec, below the recognition 
threshold for neutral words. Each subject's accuracy score
21
was then determined by subtracting his accuracy score for 
neutral words from his accuracy score for emotional words. 
Difference scores for the stimulus-absent group were determined 
in the same way; but because they received hash marks instead 
of the words in the tachistoscopic presentations, the accuracy 
scores were based upon a predetermined random order of word 
presentation. The mean difference score for the stimulus- 
absent group was not significantly different from that for the 
stimulus-present group, indicating that the presence of the 
stimulus words had no significant effect on the recognition 
thresholds. In addition to this, the difference scores for 
the stimulus-absent group were significantly different from 
zero. This would normally have been interpreted a PD if the 
stimuli had actually been presented instead of hash marks.
In a later study Goldstein (1964) found similar results 
when all his subjects were tested under three conditions: 
stimulus present, stimulus absent, and forced choice. Response 
bias was determined for each condition, and his hypothesis 
was confirmed that the magnitude of PD was equal for stimulus- 
absent and stimulus-present conditions. From Goldstein's data 
it appears that the most relevant factor in PD studies is the 
response that is required rather than the emotionality of the 
stimulus— suggesting that PD, as it is here defined, doesn't 
really exist.
There have been a number of attempts to determine the 
effect of PD by measuring and correcting for response suppression.
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Mathews & Wertheimer (1958), for instance, told their subjects 
that one of eight words would be presented tachistoscopically 
each time. However, two of the four emotional words and two 
of the four neutral words were never shown. It was hypothe­
sized that in the absence of any response suppression equal 
numbers of the neutral and emotional words in the never- 
presented group would be called. A pure measure of response 
suppression in the form of a Z score was determined by com­
paring the absent emotional words called to the absent neutral 
words called. A similar Z score for each subject was determined 
for his calls of the emotional and neutral words which were 
presented. This Z score represented both PD and response 
suppression. After the Z score for response suppression was 
subtracted, the resulting score represented a "pure measure 
of PD" uncontaminated by response suppression. PD was found 
even after the response suppression was taken from it.
Minard (1965) reported a doctoral study in which he repli­
cated and extended the research previously done by Mathews & 
Wertheimer. In this experiment the subjects were given a card 
containing the eight stimulus words, but as before only four 
of these words were ever presented. In addition to this smudged 
blank slides were presented instead of stimulus words through­
out the trials to get pseudoaccuracy scores for each subject.
The response suppression was then determined as the difference 
between the neutral responses which were guesses and the emo­
tional responses which were guesses. Guesses included responses
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to the smudged blanks and all inaccurate responses. The PD 
was then determined as the differences between neutral responses 
which were accurate and the emotional responses which were 
accurate. Minard found the response suppression to be insig­
nificant and the PD to be significant even after the response 
suppression was accounted for,
Sarbin & Chun (1967), recognizing the improvement in 
Minard's changes of Mathews & Wertheimer's method of eliminating 
the effects of response suppression, suggested that the Z score 
for response bias be determined from all the incorrect responses 
rather than just the incorrect responses from the never presented 
stimuli. In addition to this they allowed the subjects to 
respond with a number rather than with the emotional or peutral 
word which was presented to them tachistoscopically. When 
these changes were incorporated into their study, Sarbin &
Chun found no significant PD effect. This, they concluded, 
was due to the fact that the subjects' responses were numbers 
representing their answers rather than the neutral or emotional 
responses themselves.
Another approach to controlling response suppression has 
been to eliminate it by using a forced choice technique in 
which the alternatives for any particular choice have been 
all emotional or all neutral. Bootzin & Natsoulas (1965) 
presented to their subjects neutral and emotional words at 
.01 and .03 seconds as well as hash marks at .01 seconds. 
Following the presentations of each word or set of hash marks,
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the subject was given a choice between two words equal in 
emotionality, familiarity, and length. There were two blocks 
of stimulus presentations, each block being comprised of two 
presentations of each of the eight words at each duration plus 
presentations of the hash marks for each of the response pos­
sibilities, making a total of 96 presentations. At the ,03- 
second exposures on the first block there were significant 
differences between the recognition thresholds for emotional 
and neutral words, but this was not true at the .01-second 
exposures. This suggests that there was PD uncontaminated 
by response suppression at the .03-second exposure level but 
not at the .01-second exposure level. At the .01 level the 
responses to the words as well as those to the hash marks 
did not differ from chance. From block 1 to block 2 there 
was a significant improvement in accuracy for emotional words 
at the .03 level but not for the neutral words. This suggests 
that one habituates to the emotionality of the words over 
trials and that with more trials the PD will disappear entirely. 
This is a significant finding that is supported by other re­
search (Bootzin & Stephens, 1967; Brown, 1961; Goldstein, 1966; 
Natsoulas, 1965; Zajonc, 1962).
From these studies one can see that there have been a 
number of attempts to eliminate the response inhibition expla­
nation for the PD phenomenon: manipulating the type of response 
that is required (Goldstein et al,, 1962; Loiselle, 1966; 
Loiselle & Williamson, 1966; Nothman, 1962; Taylor et al.,
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1961; Zajonc, 1962), forced choice from responses of equal 
emotionality (Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; Bootzin & Stephens, 
1967), and measuring the degree of response suppression and 
subtracting it from perceptual tendencies (Goldstein, 1962,
1964, 1966; Mathews & Wertheimer, 1958; Minard, 1965; Minard 
et al., 1965; Minard & Mooney, 1969; Sarbin & Chun, 1967).
Control of the Stimulus Effect;
In spite of the apparent success that some of these exper­
imenters have had in controlling or eliminating response biases, 
few of them have even considered the possibility that the tend­
ency to inhibit an emotional response might be instigated by 
the perception of the stimulus. This is to suggest that response 
bias might occur only when it is activated. This does not deny 
the fact that response suppression exists as it is usually 
thought of— the simple tendency to avoid giving a taboo or 
emotional response-. However, it is suggested here that response 
suppression might be greater or less depending upon the nature 
of the stimulus; and in the absence of any method of measuring 
this "stimulus effect" (Natsoulas, 1965), it is possible that 
the results of a perceptual study would be interpreted as 
demonstrating PD when they actually represent differential 
response tendencies based upon the emotionality associated 
with the stimuli.
The relevance of this stimulus effect to PD studies was 
first introduced by Blum (1955) when he tested and supported
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the hypothesis:
subjects predisposed to use the mechanism of repression 
in conjunction with a given conflict will, when confronted 
subliminally with a conflict-relevant stimulus, show 
defensive behavior directly traceable to the perceptual 
process itself (p.25).
In this study Blum presented quadrads of Blacky Pictures to 
graduate students in Psychology at a subliminal level of stim­
ulation and instructed the subjects to identify the picture 
in each area of the quadrad. The emotionality or degree of 
conflict associated with each picture for each subject was 
determined by a number of tests as was the degree to which 
one exhibited repression on each dimension represented by the 
Blacky Pictures. Out of the 11 possible pictures, however, 
the same four were always presented— two neutral and two emo­
tional (the emotional pictures being those that had a signi­
ficant amount of conflict associated with them as well as the 
defense mechanism of repression to avoid them). Consequently 
there were two categories of responses: those that were always 
presented and those that were never presented. Blum found 
that for the pictures which were presented there were fewer 
calls of emotional pictures than neutral pictures: 9.42 to 
17.12 with 17.46 being the calls which would be expected for 
any one picture according to chance. This difference was 
significant at the .001 level of confidence, but for the absent 
pictures there were no significant differences: 15.20 to 16.69. 
This indicated that the emotionality of the stimulus did dif­
ferentially affect the responses:
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An avoidance response to a subliminal stimulus has taken 
place. Apparently the subject makes an unconscious visual 
discrimination which somehow cues off an avoidance re­
action. The threatening stimulus must actually be pro­
vided by the environment in order for this defensive 
response to be instigated. With respect to antecedent 
conditions, we now know that it takes a combination of 
conflict in an area plus a predisposition to repress that 
conflict to produce the avoidance. Conflict alone has 
no discernible effect (Blum, 1955, pp.27-28).
In a very similar study Blum (1957) demonstrated that 
subjects who preferred the avoidance alternative for a Blacky 
Picture on the DPI (Defense Preference Inquiry for Blacky 
Pictures) reported perception of that picture less frequently 
when it was one of the discriminable stimuli than when it was 
a possible response that had not been used in the stimulus.
Blum pointed out that this effect was significant for a low 
accuracy group of subjects but not for a high accuracy group - 
thus providing evidence for the differential effects of person­
ality characteristics on perception. Explanation of this 
phenomenon in terms of selective verbal report (response sup­
pression) is again ruled out by the lack of a significant 
difference in the absent picture condition. If it were verbal 
suppression, pictures associated with avoidance defenses would 
be undercalled even in the absent condition.
In these two studies Blum has demonstrated that stimuli 
representing some psychosexual conflict for the subject can 
trigger a defensive reaction in certain (repressive) subjects 
that leads to response suppression for those stimuli. The 
implications of this finding for a more thorough understanding 
of the PD phenomenon are indicated by the following statement:
When we recall that PD is not confined to strictly libid­
inous stimuli such as Blum used, it is tempting to specu­
late on the generality of Blum's vigilance effect with 
other types of emotional stimuli; more experimental work 
is required on this point (Rrown, 1961, p.68).
In spite of this suggestion by Brown and a similar plea 
by Natsoulas (1965), the present writer finds that very little 
attempt has been made in PD research to pursue the stimulus- 
effect findings of Blum. Examples of attempts to control or 
reduce response inhibition were discussed earlier, but most 
of these researchers have ignored the possibility that differ­
ences in recognition thresholds between ES and NS could be due 
to the stimulus effect--an inhibitory response activated by 
the perception of the stimulus,
Blum's research tends to indicate that partial perception 
of ES activates some defensive mechanism which may act in the 
same way as response suppression. His results were not ana­
lyzed in terms of the specific responses that were elicited 
by the ES and NS. In fact, the only matter of concern was 
whether or not subjects were responding differently to them, 
but the results suggest that the way one responds to stimuli 
is affected by the amount of emotionality associated with them
PROBLEM
The purpose of this study was to propose a method of 
evaluating the stimulus-effect hypothesis as well as an effect 
ive way of measuring PD at different levels of stimulation. 
While most researchers in the past have been satisfied with
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one general measure of response suppression and have ignored 
the possible effect that stimuli may have on response tenden­
cies, there was in this study a breakdown of "response sup­
pression" into two parts: the tendency to suppress emotional 
responses when the stimulus is emotional and the tendency to 
suppress emotional responses when the stimulus is neutral.
The former tendency will hereafter be referred to as Ert 
(response tendency following ES); and the latter tendency will 
be referred to as Nrt (response tendency following NS). Any 
significant differences between the two tendencies as they 
are here defined would tend to support or refute the stimulus- 
effect hypothesis: that partial perception of ES activates an 
avoidance reaction which reduces emotional responses. PD will 
be defined as the elevation of recognition thresholds for ES 
when compared with the recognition thresholds for NS. Notice 
that nothing is said in this definition about response tend­
encies. This is an essential point, for PD is defined as a 
perceptual phenomenon which is not affected by response tend­
encies, The percentage of correct responses will be affected 
by Ert, Nrt, and PD; but once the effects of response tenden­
cies are accounted for, any remaining differences between 
correct calls to ES and correct calls to NS will be a function 
solely of PD.
HYPOTHESES
1) Stimulus-effect hypothesis: that across all levels of
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stimulation the tendency to inhibit emotional responses will 
be greater when ES are presented than when NS are presented.
2) Perceptual Defense hypothesis: that across all levels of
stimulation the tendency to recognize NS correctly will be 
greater than the tendency to recognize ES correctly, and that 
this tendency will be greater for "repressors" than,; for "intel- 
lectualizers". This hypothesized difference between repressors 
and intellectualizers has been supported by the general finding 
that repressors tend to avoid contact with emotional material 
more than do intellectualizers and thus have higher recognition 
thresholds for ES (Blum, 1955, 1957; Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; 




Forty female undergraduates volunteered to participate 
in this experiment to fulfill their experimental requirements 
for an introductory course in psychology which was given during 
the spring quarter, 1969, at the University of Montana. A 
few of the subjects had participated in other experiments, 
but the majority of them were freshmen who were naive about 
psychological experiments.
Apparatus:
A Hunter GSR amplifier was used to indicate the physio­
logical responses to words which were presented in a Polymetric
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I
Model #V0959T tachistoscope. The same tachistoscope was also 
used in the perceptual task. In a brief pilot study preceeding 
this study it was determined that single words were easily 
recognized at the shortest exposure time (.01 seconds) when 
no attempt was made to obscure them. Therefore, the target 
which each subject was instructed to focus upon prior to the 
presentation of the stimulus word was changed so that a series 
of X's covered the spot upon which the word would be presented 
instead of a single X to indicate the center of the stimulus 
word. This increased the difficulty of the perceptual task 
to such a degree that most subjects were responding within 
the limits of chance accuracy at the .01-second exposure time 
while they were responding with better than 70% accuracy at 
the .03-second exposure time.
Procedure:
The study was conducted in three parts over an eight week 
period. The first part was designed to select emotional and 
neutral words which were matched for length and familiarity; 
the second part to present these words tachistoscopically to 
determine the amount of PD, Ert, and Nrt that occurred; and 
the third part to administer Byrne's "Health and Opinion Survey" 
(Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963) to differentiate intellectual­
izers and repressors.
During the first part of the study each subject was seen 
individually and introduced to the study with the following 
statement:
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Before we go ahead with this study I want to tell you 
a little bit about it so you can decide whether or not 
you want to participate in it. If you decide not to 
participate in the study, you can leave right now and 
get one hour of credit for coming here today. Then you 
can make up the other hours later on in the quarter.
If you decide to go ahead with the study, we'11 go ahead 
with this hour and then make appointments for the other 
hours later on.
This is a study in perception, and I have a group of 
words that you will have to see and in somp cases say.
Now, the only thing that might be somewhat objectionable 
to you is that some of these words are what you might 
call socially unacceptable or taboo words, and the 
situation could be somewhat embarrassing for you. I've 
explained this to the other subjects, and no one has 
seemed to mind that much; but if you'd rather not parti­
cipate in the study because of this, then you're certainly 
free to say so now. If you want to go ahead with the 
study, then you can say so and I'll go ahead and explain 
the rest of it to you.
None of the subjects chose to drop out of the study, 
and as each agreed to continue, she was told how to sort the 
words with respect to familiarity. This procedure was similar 
to the one used by Bryant et al. (1967) who found that sub­
jective evaluation was a more effective way of controlling 
stimulus familiarity in PD studies than the more common pro­
cedure of selecting words with matched frequencies in Thorn­
dike and Lorge's list of 30,000 words (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944). 
Each subject was given the following instructions:
Here I have 30 cards, and there is a word typed on each 
card. I want you to look over all 30 words and then sort 
them into 5 piles from the most familiar word to the least 
familiar word. Now, familiarity is to be determined by 
how often or how many times you've seen the word, heard 
the word, or read the word. And when you're sorting the 
words into the 5 piles, I want you to try not to think 
in terms of meaning, of value, of how pleasant or unpleas­
ant the words are, or of anything except familiarity.
And remember...by familiarity I mean how often you've 
seen the word, heard the word, or read the word, OK...
Are there any questions?
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As soon as the subject finished this task, she was handed the 
first pile which she had just sorted (the most familiar words) 
and told:
Now I want you to sort the words in this pile with the 
most familiar word on the bottom up to the least familiar 
word on the top.
When this was done the experimenter picked up this pile, took 
off the top three cards and put them on the next pile, and 
asked the subject to sort that pile in the same way - with the 
most familiar word on the bottom up to the least familiar word 
on the top. When the 5 piles had been sorted in this way and 
collected by the experimenter, the 30 cards were given back 
to the subject in the order of her judged familiarity. She 
was then told to look through the words to be sure that they 
were in the right order and to change the order of any of them 
if she wanted to.
The words to be sorted were 30 five-letter nouns and 30 
six-letter nouns, each of which was typed at the top of a plain 
3 X 5  card. Ten of the words in each group of 30 were selected 
by the experimenter because they were considered to be 'dirty' 
words and words that would generally elicit embarrassment when 
spoken in mixed company. The other 20 words in each group 
differed widely with respect to familiarity as indicated by 
the Thorndike-Lorge word book. As soon as a subject was satis­
fied that the words in the first group were in the right order, 
she was given the second group to sort in the same way. The 
order of each group of words was then recorded as the subject 
filled out the questionnaire in Table 1 on page 34.
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Table 1
(Questionnaire for evaluating stimulus emotionality)
Imagine that you are to discuss with me each of the words in 
the following list. Rate each word in terms of the feelings 
that you think you would have while using and discussing it 
according to the following criteria:
1  ̂relaxed 2 = uneasy 3 = disturbed 4 = very disturbed
This report wilf be kept confidential, and you will not be 
asked to explain any of your responses. Try to be as honest 

























There were no formal instructions during the rest of the 
experiment, but an attempt was made to impart to each subject 
the same information and expectations. Upon the completion 
of the questionnaire each subject was connected to a GSR am­
plifier and told that these words would be presented to her 
individually for a duration of about two seconds in the tach­
istoscope at 15 second intervals. She was asked to look at 
each word while it was being presented and to say it as soon 
as it disappeared from the screen. She was then told that it 
was understandable that she might not want to say some of the 
words, and in such cases she might remain silent. However, 
she was encouraged to say each word, as it "would be better 
for the study."
Each group of 30 words was presented in random order 
twice to each subject, and the maximum GSR in the 5-second 
period following the presentation of each word was recorded 
as the subject's response to that word. The 6-letter words 
were presented first followed by the 5-letter words, and then 
the 6-letter words were presented again followed by the 5- 
letter words. Following the presentation of each group of 
words there was a short rest period during which the subject 
was encouraged to get more comfortable, take a deep breath, 
etc. Immediately before the presentation of each group the 
subject was asked to remain as still as possible, as any move­
ment would cause readings on the amplifier that could contam­
inate the data.
In the analysis of these data for the selection of ES 
the GSRs elicited by each word in blocks of 10 words were 
considered first. The 5 words with the highest GSRs in each 
block were marked as 'potentially emotional1 words, and the 
only words which were considered in the final analysis were 
those which were ranked 'potentially emotional' both times 
that they were presented. These words were then listed and 
scored with respect to the subject's rating of each word on 
the questionnaire. From these words the 8 words with the 
highest subjective ratings were selected as the ES. No word 
with a rating of 1 was selected as an emotional word. In 5 
cases, however, subjects gave less than 8 of the words ratings 
higher than 1; and in these cases the subject was given back 
the questionnaire and asked to differentiate somewhat more 
between the words.
The neutral words consisted of those 1) that were ranked 
as not 'potentially emotional' at least one of the two times 
that they were presented, and 2) that were given a rating of 
1 on the questionnaire. Since pairs of emotional and neutral 
words matched with respect to familiarity were needed in this
i
study, the neutral word which was closest to an emotional word 
on the familiarity scale was selected as the 'mate' of that 
emotional word provided that the words were not separated by 
more than 3 words on the scale. If there were no neutral words 
close enough to an emotional word for this kind of pairing, 
that word was not selected as an ES for the second phase of
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the study. Eight pairs of words were selected for a subject 
whenever possible. In a number of cases this many pairs was 
not available; and when it was not possible to get at least 
6 pairs of words, that subject was eliminated from the study.
In order to get 40 subjects, 59 subjects were put through this 
first phase of the experiment. Nineteen of these subjects 
were disqualified due to the fact that it was not possible 
to get at least 6 pairs of words by the criteria discussed 
above.
The second part of the experiment was conducted from one 
to six weeks after the first part following the selection of 
4 groups of 4 words (2 neutral and 2 emotional words) which 
were matched with respect to length and familiarity as deter­
mined by the procedures of the first part of the experiment.
(For those cases in which only 6 or 7 pairs of words could be
used, one or 2 of the pairs were used twice in order to have
4 groups with 4 words in each group.) These words were pre­
sented tachistoscopically one at a time with instructions to 
select each of her responses from a list of 4 possible responses 
that were presented immediately following the presentation of 
the test word. To minimize the effects of response bias a 
procedure similar to the one employed by Sarbin & Chun (4967) 
was used, in which the subjects were instructed not to say the 
word which they chose as their response but to say the number
beside the word. The 4 possible responses were the groups
selected during the first part of the experiment. They were
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made up of the stimulus word, a word of similar emotional 
content, and 2 matched words from the opposite emotionality 
category, ie. 2 emotional and 2 neutral words.
At any one exposure level a subject had to make 80 dis­
criminations, for each word in each of the 4 groups was pre­
sented randomly 5 times. There were 3 exposure times: .01,
.02, and .03 seconds; and the order in which these exposures 
were used was manipulated so that all possible combinations 
were used.
In the third part of the experiment each subject was 
given Byrne’s "Health and Opinion Survey1' (Byrne, et al.,
1963) to differentiate repressors and sensitizers. Normative 
data were based primarily upon a sample similar to the one 
used in this study; and as the reported mean for females was 
42.68, those who scored lower than 42.68 were classified as 
repressors while those with higher scores were classified as 
sensitizers. By this criterion 13 of the 40 subjects were 
classified as repressors, and 27 were classified as sensitizers.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The data for each individual were summarized in tables 
similar to the one below to indicate the frequency and type 




correct emotional ________ *
RESPONSE correct neutral ..............
incorrect emotional  ___________  '
incorrect neutral  _________________
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Computations were made on the raw data to determine the 
amounts of Nrt and Ert that occurred. This provided the in­
formation necessary for testing the first hypothesis. It also 
made it possible to adjust the correct responses to NS and ES 
to account for and eliminate the effects of Nrt and Ert. This 
then provided the information necessary for testing the second 
hypothesis.
As an example of how this procedure worked, consider an 
hypothetical situation in which the recognition of neutral 
words is 30% above chance while the recognition of emotional 
words is only 10% above chance. This is the sort of situation 
which would exist if PD occurs. Suppose also that response 
tendencies are such that emotional responses to NS are sup­
pressed 14% of the time (Nrt) while emotional responses to 
ES are suppressed 23% of the time (Ert),
To facilitate understanding of how this hypothetical 
example is derived, consider the following steps:
Suppose that 40 neutral and 40 emotional words were presented 
individually and that following the presentations the subject 
responded by calling one of four possible words (as described 
earlier in the design of this study). In the absence of any 
perceptual effect or any response effect, the subject would 
respond randomly as indicated in the table below:
STIMULUS 
emotional neutral
correct emotional 10 0
RESPONSE correct neutral 0 10
incorrect emotional lb 20
incorrect neutral 20 10
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If PD occurred so that the recognition of neutral words was
30% above chance while the recognition of emotional words was
only 10% above chance, the following results would occur:
STIMULUS 
emotional neutral
correct emotional (a) 13 0
RESPONSE correct neutral 0 (A) 19
incorrect emotional (b) ' 9 (B) 14
incorrect neutral (c) 18 cc ; 7
If in addition to this there was Nrt of 14% and Ert of 23% 
the following results would occur:
STIMULUS 
emotional neutral
correct emotional 10 0
RESPONSE correct neutral 0 20
incorrect emotional 7 12
incorrect neutral 23 8
This represents the raw data which would result if the recog­
nition of neutral words were 30% above chance, if the recog­
nition of emotional words were 10% above chance, if Nrt amounted 
to 14%, and if Ert amounted to 23%. These facts, of course, 
are what we need to determine by the analysis of these raw data. 
To do this assume the following equalities:
For responses to neutral stimuli
A = correct neutral responses in the absence of Nrt 
B = incorrect emotional responses in the absence of Nrt 
C = incorrect neutral responses in the absence of Nrt 
x = Nrt
xB = emotional responses suppressed
For responses to emotional stimuli
a = correct emotional responses in the absence of Ert 
b = incorrect emotional responses in the absence of Ert 
c = incorrect neutral responses in the absence of Ert 
y = Ert
ya+yb = emotional responses suppressed
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Given:
A + B + C = 40




a - ya ' b - yb
Determination of Nrt Determination of Ert
A = 20 - xfi/2 a = 10 + ya
B = 12 + xB b = 7 + yb
c = 8 - xB/2 c = 23 -  ya - yb
40 = A +  B + C 40 = a + b + c
B = 40 -  A -  C 40 = 10 + ya + 7 + yb + 14 + 2yb
B - 40 -  20 +  xB/2 - 8 +  xB/2 9 = ya +  3yb
B =  12 + xB i& ikB =  2C 10 7
B =  16 -  xB ya r— 1.4 ybB =  12 +  xB 9 .-«T 1.4 yb +  3yb
2B =  28 9 = 4.4 yb
B *  14 yt> = 2B = ?  12 +  xB b = 7 +  2
14 =  12 +  xB b zz 9
xB =  2 y9 = 2xl4 = *  2 y = .22
X = .14 a = 10 +  ya
A =  20 -  xB/2 ya = 1.4 ybA =  20 -  1 ya = ;2.8 (3 rounded)
A = 19 a = 1 0 + 3
a - 13
These computations have indicated that for this one subject 
at this one exposure level Ert is greater than Nrt. To test 
the stimulus-effect hypothesis in the present study these 
two tendencies were compared for each subject at each exposure 
time; and when Ert was greater than Nrt, the subject was given 
a score of +1. When Nrt was greater than Ert, the subject 
was given a score of -1. Occasionally Ert and Nrt were equal. 
In order to include such cases in the analysis without dis­
torting the size of the sample, the subject was given a score 
of +V2 and -46 at that exposure time when these two tendencies
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were equal. Hypothesis 1 was then tested at each exposure 
time by the Chi square test of goodness of fit - the null 
hypothesis predicting that there will be the same number of 
minus scores as plus scores. The hypothesis was also tested 
over the combined frequencies in the same way except that a 
subject was given a +1 score when the Ert was greater than 
Nrt on at least 2 out of the 3 exposure times and a -1 when 
the tendency was just the opposite. Again, when the tendencies 
were equal, the subject received a score of +36 and -36. The 
results are tabulated below in Table 2.
The perceptual defense hypothesis was tested in a similar 
way for all 40 subjects, as well as for the repressors as one 
group and the sensitizers as another group. At each exposure 
time a subject was given a +1 score when the number of correct 
responses to neutral stimuli after the correction for Nrt 
(value identified in the example as A) was greater than the 
number of correct responses to emotional stimuli after the 
correction for Ert (value identified in the example as a).
When these correct neutral responses were less than the correct 
emotional responses, the subject was given a -1 for that ex­
posure time; and if the responses were equal in number, the 
subject received a score of +36 and -36. The results are tab­
ulated below in Table 3.\
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Table 2
(Chi Square Analysis of Hypothesis 1) 







(Chi Square Analysis of Hypothesis 2)
Exposure 13 Repressors 27 Sensitizers Repressors - 
time 9 0 Sensitizers
CN - CE J T  CN - CE JT X 2
.03 -6 2.77 -6 1.34 <1
.02 -3 <1 -1 <1 <1
.01 3 <1 -6 1.34 1.03
combined -4 1.23 -6 1.34 <1
It is apparent from these results that neither hypothesis 
was confirmed. The only difference which was significant at 
the .05 level of significance occurred in the test of the first 
hypothesis at the .03-second exposure time, and this difference 
was in the opposite direction to that predicted.
DISCUSSION
Both of the hypotheses implied that a subject's behavior 
is affected by some aspect of ES which is perceived below the 
level of awareness* The first hypothesis predicted that partial 
perception of ES would result in an increased tendency to in­
hibit emotional responses, and the second hypothesis predicted 
that partial perception of the same ES would result in elevated
recognition thresholds for these stimuli. The failure to 
confirm either of the hypotheses leaves unsupported the con­
tention that subjects are affected by the emotionality assoc­
iated with stimuli whfch are presented subliminally. The 
significant difference between Ert and Nrt at the .03-second 
exposure did not support the stimulus effect hypothesis, but 
it suggests the possibility that there might be a more complex 
relationship between response tendency and stimulus emotion­
ality than hypothesized. Further research is needed to de­
termine this.
As discussed earlier a number of researchers have accounted 
for PD in terms of response suppression, a generalized tendency 
to inhibit certain responses and to prefer others. Such a 
tendency is relevant to PD studies, so that most researchers 
who support the PD phenomenon have attempted to eliminate or 
account for response tendencies in their analysis of the re­
lationship between perception and stimulus emotionality. In 
the present study a t_ test, carried out on the raw data, showed 
that there were significantly more correct neutral responses 
than correct emotional responses; and when response tendencies 
were measured by a Chi Square analysis of the deviation from 
randomness in the incorrect responses to ES and NS, it was 
found that there was a significant tendency to suppress emo­
tional responses. The failure to find significant differences 
between correct neutral and correct emotional responses after 
correcting for response tendencies (Table 3, p.43) suggests
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that the data in the present study can be adequately accounted 
for by a response bias explanation-
In the present study there were a number of relatively 
new approaches to measuring different variables. Familiarity, 
for instance, was determined by a ranking technique rather 
than by selection of words from the Thorndike-Lorge word book. 
Research tends to indicate that ranking is the more effective 
procedure, as it takes into consideration each individual’s 
experience with words rather than assuming that all subjects 
are equally familiar with them. More research is needed, 
however, to develop a set of instructions and procedures that 
gives all of the subjects the same mental set regarding the 
task.
The measurement of emotionality by GSRs and subjective 
evaluation is also a new approach in PD studies. Common 
approaches in the past have been to.select stimulus words by 
a word association test or to pair words with aversive stimuli 
to make them emotional. Such different procedures, however, 
may result in the utilization of ES that differ with respect 
to the 'kind of emotionality' which is associated with them. 
This, in turn, could result in conflicting findings from one 
study to the next; for a subject might not respond to a word 
associated with fear, for instance, in the same way that he 
would respond to a word associated with excitement or happiness 
or failure, etc. The formulation of a generally acceptable 
definition of 'emotionality' and the development of a standard
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way of measuring it might resolve some of the conflicting 
results of PD studies.
A similar matter of concern for PD studies is that ES 
may lose their emotional quality with continued use. Research 
has shovm that subjects tend to habituate to the emotionality 
of words over trials and that with more trials PD tends to 
disappear (Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; Bootzin & Stephens,
1967; Brown, 1961; Goldstein, 1966; Natsoulas, 1965; Zajonc, 
1962). In the present study no PD was found, but this was 
after the subjects had sorted the words with respect to fam­
iliarity, scored them on the emotionality questionnaire, and 
responded to them in the tachistoscope. It is possible that 
the ES were no longer emotional by the time they were presented 
in the second phase of the experiment. An improvement in the 
present study might therefore have been the use of a second 
measurement of emotionality after the tachistoscopic present­
ation of the stimuli.
Another new aspect of the present study was the model 
utilized in the analysis of the data. As indicated in the 
example on pages 39 & 40 it was assumed in this model that 
Nrt would reduce the incorrect emotional responses by a certain 
amount and increase both the correct and incorrect neutral 
responses by equal parts of that amount. It was also assumed 
that Ert would reduce correct and incorrect emotional responses 
by proportionate amounts and increase the incorrect neutral 
responses by that amount. These are logical assumptions that
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provide the means by which qne can measure and compare the 
variables in question. However, it is nonetheless true that 
they are assumptions, the core of an hypothetical model, and 
as such they are based on logic rather than fact. An extension 
of the present research by utilizing different statistical 
models might lead to a more thorough understanding of the 
PD phenomenon# One might well question, for instance, the 
additive relationship which is typically assumed to exist 
between perceptual tendencies and response tendencies. If, 
in fact, these tendencies are not additive in their effect 
upon behavior, current approaches to analyzing perceptual 
data could be overcorrecting or undercorrecting for response 
bias.
In the present study neither hypothesis was confirmed.
The presentation of ES was not found to disrupt perception 
nor to increase a subject's tendency to suppress emotional 
responses. As pointed out in the introduction, past PD studies 
have failed to control adequately all of the confounding var­
iables that affect subject1s behavior. It is therefore likely 
that when the present controls are employed to select ES and 
NS and to eliminate the confounding effects of familiarity 
and response tendencies, neither PD nor the stimulus effect 
will be found. Better controls, the utilization of different 
types of ES, and continued research into the relationship 
between perceptual tendencies and response tendencies might 
resolve some of the conflicting findings in PD research.
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SUMMARY
A perceptual defense study was conducted in which recog­
nition thresholds for taboo and neutral words were determined 
while controlling for familiarity and response bias. It was 
hypothesized: l) that the tendency to inhibit emotional re­
sponses would be greater when the stimulus was emotional than 
when it was neutral, and 2) that perceptual defense would 
occur across all subjects but to a greater degree for repressors 
than for sensitizers.
The experiment was conducted in three parts: 1) selection 
of the stimuli for each subject individually, 2) tachistoscopic 
presentation of the words, 3) group administration of a person­
ality inventory. Neither hypothesis was supported. There 
were significantly more correct neutral responses than correct 
emotional responses across all of the subjects; but when re­
sponse tendencies were accounted for, there was no significant 
difference in the perception of neutral and emotional words 
either within or between the two groups of subjects. There 
was a significant difference between the response tendencies 
following emotional and neutral stimuli at the .03-second 
exposure time, but this difference was in the opposite direction 
to that predicted. This leaves open the question of whether 
or not there is some relationship between stimulus emotionality 
and response bias.
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